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NOTES AND COMMENTS
decisions some authorities persisted in clinging to the old view. This
attitude appeared in the decision in the state court in the instant case.
3 2
The effect of the decision of the Supreme Court should be to make it
plain that its attitude in the Nebbia case is now its settled policy; that
hereafter price legislation need be justified by no special circumstances
under the label "affected with a public interest" or otherwise. This
decision is in line with recent trends toward a controlled economy, and
obviously makes it possible for governmental action to supplant free
competition as our principal means of determining prices. The new
approach will eliminate judicial legislation as to which businesses are
suitable for price control; yet by treating price fixing as an ordinary
exercise of the police power, a check against capricious and arbitrary
legislation will be preserved. JAMEs F. LAWRENCE, JR.
Contempt of Court-Construction of Federal Statute Concerning
Punishment for Contempt
In the case of Nye v. United States,' the Supreme Court, by con-
struction of section 268 of the judicial code, 2 has stringently abridged
the power of the federal district courts3 to punish summarily for
contempt.
4
(1937); Mayo v. 14keland Highlands Canning Co., Inc., 309 U. S. 310, 60 Sup.
Ct. 517, 84 L. ed. 481 (1940) (a preliminary injunction was denied against en-
forcement of a statute fixing prices of citrus juices in the citrus fruit industry).
State price regulation has been upheld in the following cases: Highland Farms
Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 608, 57 Sup. Ct. 549, 81 L. ed. 835 (1937);
Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 251, 56 Sup. Ct. 453, 80
L. ed. 669 (1936); Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163, 55 Sup.
Ct. 7, 79 L. ed. 259 (1934) ; cf. Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S.
266, 56 Sup. Ct. 457, 80 L. ed. 675 (1936) (the court held unreasonable and arbi-
trary a classification created by a N. Y. statute which limited the benefit of a
price differential to milk dealers not having a well-advertised trade name to those
who were already engaged in the milk business at a certain date).
'2 State v. Kinney, 138 Neb. 574, 293 S. W. 393 (1940).
'Nye v. United States, 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 733 (1941), Note
(1941) 54 HARv. L. Rav. 1397. Followed in Millinocket Theatre v. Kurston, 39
F. Supp. 979 (D. Me., 1941). Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F. (2d) 642 (App. D. C.
1941) (retroactive operation of Nye decision).
236 Stat. 1163 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §385 (1928) ("The said courts shall
have the power to impose and administer all necessary oaths, and to punish,
by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court, contempts of their
authority. Such power to punish contempts shall- not be construed to extend
to any cases except the misbehavior of any person in their presence, or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of
the officers of said courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or re-
sistance by any such officer, or by any party, juror, witness, or other person
to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts").
I As to bankruptcy proceedings, see Boyd v. Glucklick, 116 Fed. 131 (D.
Iowa, 1902). As to disobedience of an injunction outside the district, see Myers
v. United States, 264 U. S. 95, 44 Sup. Ct. 272, 62 L. ed. 577 (D. C. W. D.
Mo., 1924).
'This note will not deal with the constitutionality of the statute. The power
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E., administrator, brought a wrongful death action against B. and
C. in the federal district court for the middle district of North Carolina.
N., a son-in-law of one of the defendants in the wrongful death action,
and M., his tenant, brought E., an "illiterate, and feeble in mind and
body", from his home to a town at a considerable distance from the
middle district. N. and M. plied E. with liquor, and kept him in N.'s
home overnight. The next morning, when E. was sober, but still under
the influence of N. and M, they induced him to seek a termination of
the action. The letter to the district court was prepared by N.'s lawyer
and mailed by N. E. was not paid anything. The district court fined
N. and M., after summary proceeding, for contempt. The circuit court
of appeals upheld this decision,5 but the Supreme Court reversed it on
the grounds that the acts were not misbehavior in the presence of the
court, "or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice"
within the meaning of s. 268 of the judicial code.
Ever since- Congress, in 1831, as the result of the acquittal of a
federal judge who punished summarily a critical newspaper editor,0
passed the ancestor of the present statute, limiting the power to punish
for contempt, the construction of the language used has been a judicial
problem of no mean proportions. On the one hand the courts are faced
with a loss of control over indirect contempts if they construe the statute
geographically; on the other hand, a cause and effect interpretation runs
afoul of the policy of strict construction of a criminal statute and of
the literal congressional language.
The Supreme Court has at various times used both tests. In cases
involving the influencing of a witness to disobey a subpoena7 and an
altercation with a judge after court had adjourned,8 for examples, the
Supreme Court has construed the language in question in a spatial
sense. But in cases involving the shadowing of a juror outside the
courthouse, 9 adverse criticism of the court in a pending matter,10 an
of Congress to regulate contempts in the lower federal courts has long been
recognized. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42, 45 Sup. Ct. 18, 69 L.
ed. 162 (1924); Atwell v. United States, 162 Fed. 79 (C. C. A. 4th, 1908);
Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510, 22 L. ed. 205, 207 (1874). See article
by Frankfurter and Landis, cited infra note 6.
'Nye v. United States, 113 F. (2d) (C. C. A. 4th, 1940), Note (1941)
19 N. C. L. REv. 219.
1 See STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK (1833) ; Ex parte
Shenck, 65 N. C. 354 (1871) ; Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over
Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in the
Separation of Powers (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 1010.
"Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 22 L. ed. 205 (1874).
'Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364, 19 L. ed. 214 (1869).
9 United States v. Sinclair, 279 U. S. 749, 49 Sup. Ct. 471, 73 L. ed. 938
(1929).
" Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560,
62 L. ed. 1186 (1918).
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attempt to influence a witness outside of the courtroom,1 an attempt
to influence a prospective juror before he was drawn,' 2 and lynching
a prisoner after an appeal had been allowed,13 the language was con-
strued in a causal sense.
The lower federal courts have been equally confused. The bribing
of a witness,14 service of a witness with a civil process after court had
adjourned,' 5 corrupting a juror,1 publication of a newspaper article
concerning a pending matter,17 and a letter written to a special assistant
attorney general charging the judge in a pending matter with bias,' S
have all been held to be contempt within the meaning of the statute,
even though the offense in each case originated at a point geographically
removed from the court. On the other hand, in cases involving a news-
paper article about a pending matter,19 service of a writ of garnishment
on a witness during a recess of court," a letter to a litigant criticizing
the procedure in a pending matter,21 sale of assets by a bankrupt,2 2 and
wrongfully inducing a trustee in bankruptcy to pay out money,28 the
language of the statute was construed to deprive the court of jurisdiction
over such distant misconduct.
Oddly enough each of these decisions, including the principal case-
no matter which of the views it upholds-seems to reach its conclusion
by reasoning along one or both of two lines. They seek to interpret the
history of the statute and to determine the legislative intent therefrom;
or they attempt to construe the words "so near thereto".
The court in the instant case, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas,
said: "Congress was responding to grievances arising out of the exer-
cise of judicial power as dramatized by the Peck proceedings .... The
two sections of the Act of March 2, 1831 . .. clearly indicate that the
category of criminal cases which could be tried without a jury was
narrowly confined".
24
" Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267, 9 Sup. Ct. 703, 33 L. ed. 150 (1889).1 Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 280, 9 Sup. Ct. 703, 33 L. ed. 150 (1889).
" United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563, 27 Sup. Ct. 165, 51 L. ed. 319 (1906).
1 In re Brule, 71 Fed. 943 (D. Nev., 1895).
15 United States v. Zavelo, 177 Fed. 536 (C. C. N. D. Ala., 1910).
" Kirk v. United States, 192 Fed. 273 (C .C. A. 9th, 1911).
"In re Independent Publishing Co., 240 Fed. 849, (C. C. A. 9th, 1917).
" Froelich v. United States, 33 F. (2d) 660 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
1" Ex parte Poulson, 19 Fed. Cas. 1205, No. 11,350 (C. C. E. D. Pa., 1835)
(the first case decided construing the Act of 1831); Morse v. Montana Ore
Purchasing Co., 105 Fed. 337 (C. C. D. Mont., 1900).
'oEx parte Schulenberg, 25 Fed. 2il (C. C. E. D. Mich., 1885).
1 Hillman v. Insurance Co., 79 Fed. 749 (C. C. D. Kan., 1897).
" In re Probst, 205 Fed. 512 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1913).
"Morgan v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 830 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
-' Nye v. United States, 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 815, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 733 (1941);
see, 1 KE:NT'S COMMENTARIES (11th ed. 1867) 301, n.; Frankfurter and Landis,
Power of Congress Over Procedure in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Stdy in
the Separation of Powers (1924) 37 HARv. L. Rzv. 1010, 1031; Nelles and King,
Contempt By Publication (1928) 28 CALIF. L. REv. 525.
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The opposite view is typified by the statement of District Judge
Jones :25 "It is doubtful, to say the least of it, whether any of the
eminent lawyers in the Congress which adopted this provision ... had
in mind anything more than to prevent the punishment, as for contempt,
of the exercise of the right of free speech and liberty of the press in
criticizing and denouncing judicial acts".
26
When judicial interpretations of the clause "misbehavior . . . in
their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of
justice" are looked at, an equally wide divergence of attitudes is seen.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in the instant case, said: "The question is, whether
the words 'so near thereto' have a geographical or causal connotatidn.
Read in their context, and in the light of their ordinary meaning, we
conclude that they are to be construed as geographical terms".2 7  But
Mr. Chief Justice White, in the Toledo Newspaper case,28 said, "The
test, therefore, is the character of the act done, and its direct tendency
to prevent and obstruct the discharge of judicial duty".
29
It is submitted, however, that in the instant decision the court need
not have responded to either of these arguments. The coerced letter
seeking dismissal of the action was received by the court in the middle
district. It was the fulfillment of a chain of acts, all intended to obstruct
the administration of justice. No part of the operation would have
been effective unless the letter had been received by the court. The
Supreme Court might have applied the doctrine of constructive presence
as enunciated in the criminal law; i.e., that an act is committed at the
place where it takes effect.30 The pr9ceedings in question were for
criminal and not civil contempt.
In the light of this unsettled state of the law, the court seems to
have based its decision on grounds of policy. It was apparently moved
by the thought that it would be more compatible with democratic insti-
2 Ex parte McLeod, 120 Fed. 130, 137 (D. Ala. 1903).
" United States v. Huff, 206 Fed. 700 (S. D. Ga., 1913); Kirk v. United
States, 193 Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 9th, 1911); United States v. Anonymous, 21
Fed. 61 (C. C. W. D. Tenn., 1884).
2' Nye v. United States, 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 815, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 733
(1941). See, Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, 422, 38
Sup. Ct. 560, 565, 62 L. ed. 1186 (1918) (Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting) ; Cuyler
v. Atlantic & N. C. Ry., 131 Fed. 95 (C. C. E. D. N. C., 1904). See supra
notes 7, 8, 9, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.
28 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560,
62 L. ed. 1186 (1918).
" Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, 419, 38 Sup. Ct.
560, 564, 62 L. ed. 1186 (1918) ; United States v. Craig, 206 Fed. 230 (S. D. N.
Y., 1920); McCaulley v. United States, 25 App. D. C. 404 (1905). See supra
notes 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.
"0In re Independent Publishing Co., 240 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917);
Keeney v. United States, 17 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927) ; accord, Snow v.
Hawkes, 183 N. C. 365, 111 S. E. 621 (1922). This point was raised in the
Brief for the United States, p. 40, Nye v. United States, 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 85
L. ed. Adv. Ops. 733 (1941).
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tutions to insure to the accused in such cases jury trial and the other
protections afforded by criminal prosecution. Thus, the court says: "If
petitioners can be punished for their misconduct, it must be under the
criminal code, where they will be afforded the normal safeguards sur-
rounding criminal prosecutions". 3'
There are, however, countervailing considerations, as pointed out by
Mr. Justice Stone (now Mr. Chief justice Stone) in the dissent. 32 The
criminal process is slow and cumbersome and likely to be defeated by
sundry interferences. The danger of judicial tyranny in summary con-
tempt proceedings is less than the danger that a weakened judiciary will
be unable to protect its litigants against outside obstructions of justice.
It is therefore urged that Congress amend the statute. Unless this action
is taken such offenses as trial by newspaper of pending causes and non-
corrupt influencing of witnesses and jurors will, under the present rul-
ing, escape punishment altogether, either as contempts or as crimes.
FRED R. EDNEY, JP.
Elections-Federal Laws Applied to Primaries
Defendants, election officials, were charged with having altered,
falsely counted and certified the returns of ballots cast in a Democratic
primary election in Louisiana. The primary was held for nomination
of a candidate for Representative in Congress. By Louisiana law no
candidate unsuccessful in the primary could receive any votes in the
general election, "write-in" votes for such persons being disqualified
as having been cast for an ineligible candidate. 1 Because of these laws
and the one party character of Louisiana politics, the outcome of the
Democratic primary has always been tantamount to election. Indict-
ments were secured under statutes providing penalties for injury or
oppression of any citizen in the free exercise of rights secured to
him by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Held: (1) Con-
gress has the power to control fraud in such a primary election, and
(2) it had exercised that power through Sections 192 and 203 of the
Criminal Code, under which the indictments were secured.4
" Nye v. United States, 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 817, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 733.
" See, Nye v. United States, 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 818, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 733
(1941) (Mr. Justice Stone dissenting: "The question is important, for if con-
duct such as the record discloses may not be dealt with summarily the only
recourse of a federal court for the protection of integrity of proceedings pend-
ing before it, from acts of intimidation and corruption outside the court room,
is to await the indictment of the offender, with or without adjournment of the
pending proceedings as the exigencies of the case might require").
1 Serpas v. Trebucq, (La. app.) 1 So. (2d) 346 (1941) ; rehearing denied with
opinion, 1 So. (2d) 705 (1941).
2R. S. §5508; c. 321, §19, 35 Stat. 1092; 18 U. S. C. A. §51 (1927).
3R. S. §5510; c. 321, §20, 35 Stat. 1092; 18 U. S. C. A. §52 (1927).
'United States v. Classic, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 867 (1941).
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